By Konstantin Kostyuk

The Two Moralities

It would be a grave sin against truth and Orthodox Christianity if we derived fundamentalism and its cultural aggression from that spiritual call that is at the core of Orthodoxy and is radically opposed to aggression. It would be more correct to say that this call was heard and accepted, but at the same time perverted and instrumentalized by fundamentalism. There is another response to the spiritual call, allowing the Christian message to be transformed into a message of love, liberation of the individual and support for cultural development. Sooner or later, Orthodoxy will discover the path to harmonizing cultural conflicts and moral forms for the development of modernity. The roots of fundamentalism, which deepens conflicts and exacerbates moral problems, must be sought not in the religious, but in the socio-cultural sphere. We will allow ourselves to assume that the very opposition between “denying Orthodoxy” (fundamentalism) and “affirming Orthodoxy” (modern forms of Orthodoxy) originates from the clash of two moralities, two ethos, belonging to archaic and modern society.

The analysis of the cultural criticism of fundamentalism allows us to assert this. Interestingly, this criticism focuses only on some individual elements of moral decline, ignoring many others: debauchery and pornography, contraception and abortion, the moral devastation of the young and the teaching of valeology, adultery and premarital sex in schools. Here, of course, alcoholism and drug addiction are mentioned, the criminalization of society and consumerism, the ethics of experiments in genetic engineering and euthanasia, especially the spiritual chaos of “market” sectarianism and the aggressiveness of “Western” proselytism. But both the first row of problems of sexual morality and the second row of moral decay can be reduced to one problem circle – of the family marital community and the biological safety (naturalness, health) of life. Many other ethical issues – about social-institutional relations, about social violence, about totalitarian-authoritarian history and present, about the violation of individual rights, the death penalty, corruption, poverty, about the culture of public relations, even such things as drunkenness and profanity, etc. – are either almost not considered, or are reduced to the first (the destruction of the family, etc.). Some current topics such as domestic violence, emancipation, children’s rights, etc. are often not considered at all as institutional-moral problems. For the problems of the last circle, there is simply no language, concepts, or formulation of the problem. They are new, characteristic of industrial society and irrelevant to tradition. The problems of the first circle concern the theme of biological-social or sexual-gender relations inherent in the archaic gentile system, which are well known to the archaic tradition and are in a language into which all new ethical problems are translated. Moreover, if something appears as a problem in modern understandings, but is the norm for the archaic tradition (domestic violence, cf. Domostroy[29]), it is deprived of the status of a socio-moral problem.

The root of sexual morality is the gentile-sexual problematic. The main event in gentile society is biological birth, from which the genus has its life and continuation. The individual will die, but the genus will remain as long as the individual continues to give birth. The genus is eternity and god.[30] The sociocultural task of gentile society is to organize the sexual life of man. The main subject of archaic morality for millennia was the taboo of free intersexual relations and the ordering of sexual chaos. In the cultural process, the forms of sexual-social relations become more complicated, but still continue to be guided by the archaic idea of ​​sexual order. Polygamy has changed to family and subsequently monogamous relations, preserving strange and bizarre combinations between the different principles (for example, the right of the first wedding night in the strictly monogamous medieval family), but cultural control over gentile morality has not weakened for centuries.[31] The sexual freedom of the individual, rooted in his instincts, is what the generic morality fights against. Freedom is interpreted as licentiousness, it threatens the moral cosmos of the generic and must be overcome. Accordingly, freedom is the source of immoral behavior and sin. Taboo, myth, ritual, social hierarchy, social violence are the instruments by which the generic is protected from individual freedom. Just as the life of a person and the generic is not limited to sexual relations, so culture is not limited to the task of limiting them. Up to a certain point, life relationships were subject to the principles of sexual morality. But according to the degree of complexity of social relations, sexual morality increasingly gives way quantitatively. Non-sexual (production, religious, etc.) relationships are in a certain sense safe for the generic, which is why more spontaneity and greater autonomy can be allowed there. In these spheres, the individual receives space for creativity and personal responsibility. Here, he and others, not the genus, are the moral authority, and on this basis the concepts of personality, personal conscience, and autonomous reason arise. Individuals do not taboo their extrasexual relationships, but negotiate them. Their violation is not a sacred crime and is regulated by rational law. Up to a certain point, the boundaries between sexual and production morality, between morality and law are conditional. However, there comes a time when individual morality is completely freed from its subordination to the genus. In this case, sexual morality itself becomes the subject of the same free organization of the individual, as are other areas of his life. The freedom of the individual is no longer accepted as a source of evil, but as the basis of morality. Efforts are made in society to transfer ethical principles into legal ones with a moral emphasis on contractual relations. Even relations in marriage are considered and regulated according to these legal rules. Generative sexual morality is reduced to a simple “cell” of social life.

To clarify the differences between these two types of morality, we need to compare their characteristics. If generic morality is closed and prohibitive, not allowing social innovations and creativity, then personal morality, on the contrary, is open and encouraging creative productivity. If generic morality is sacred-irrational, not allowing for reflection on its moral foundations, then personal morality is secular-rational, actively forming the individual and society in response to current problems and challenges. If generic morality is used for the socialization of taboo, myth and ritual, then personal morality replaces them with self-restraint, communication and law, respectively. In other words, personal morality does not suppress freedom, as the first does, but ethically realizes it. Freedom becomes a source of reason and order, not chaos and sin. Therefore, in conditions of dynamic changes in the social world, it undoubtedly performs the tasks specific to ethics more effectively. Personal ethics is capable of revealing every ethical problem in modern society as having its source in human freedom and to one degree or another to solve it. Genital morality, effective for millennia, is not able to achieve precisely this principle of freedom, because for it it is nothing, chaos and sin. The way to solve problems in genital morality does not consist in eliminating moral conflict, but in eliminating freedom. Although both moralities have practically existed together in history, one cannot help but see their deep internal conflict. For millennia, genital morality has suppressed freedom and enslaved man. Nowadays, personal morality rejects gentile-sexual morality. From its point of view, the sexual problem is quite ordinary. From this position, it is difficult to defend the principle of the monogamous family, marital fidelity, the need to have children and even chastity. Divorce is most simply rational solution, adultery is a matter of relations between two people, the family has the right not to raise children. Sexual relations are seen as a source of pleasure and happiness, and not as an obligation to society and the family. Moreover, the fact that the historical development of personal morality, and with it of the personality and culture, was possible only because the family sexual morality reliably held back the main source of chaos in human relations, is not always realized here. We can justifiably assume that if this source were to be opened again, the entire edifice of human culture would collapse in an instant. The scenario of the “revolution of the sexual marginals” – sexual maniacs, homosexuals, debauchers, people with broken destinies and souls, single mothers, etc., has been the subject of literary attempts more than once. In the film by director M. Scorsese “Taxi Driver”, known to all Orthodox, the process of the disintegration of the “little man”, included in the soulless machine of the industrial world and unable to build a home for his own life in it – love, family, children, is convincingly traced. The victims of such tragedies today are no longer individuals, but hundreds and thousands of “little people”. Man continues to be a biological being, as evidenced by the modern sexual revolution. From this we can conclude that generic morality is not a relative historical phenomenon, but a constitution of the genus and birth, a social formation of the biological nature of man, the significance of which becomes more and more obvious the faster the enormous energy of sex, restrained and suppressed over the centuries, is released in modern culture. If we think about just a few facts – that in developed societies, celibacy has reached 30%, that the average age of marriage has passed the age of thirty, that the birth rate has become negative, that divorces cover up to 50% of marriages, that loneliness among adults is now the norm, that sexual violence (including against children) is taking on alarming proportions, that the sex industry is one of the leading economic sectors – then we will realize how far the destruction of sexual morality has reached. From this it becomes clear that – compared to the generic – personal morality is only partially and to a very limited extent able to solve the problem of human sexuality.

Starting from the described differences and collisions between generic and individual morality, the sources from which fundamentalism and its conflict with modernity originate can now become clear to us. The principles to which fundamentalism refers are rooted not only and not so much in the religious, value and cultural sphere in general, but in the archaic-biological human nature and in the archetypes of man. That is why the fact that it allies itself with other representatives of the gentile morality, such as communist or nationalist ideologies, should not surprise us.[32] Fundamentalism blocks attempts to “soften” taboos (freedom of conscience and religion), the opening of the social community (contacts and borrowings from other cultures, ecumenism and globalization), institutional development and innovation (reforms, progress, democracy, civil society). It fights the liberation of man from the power of the gentile and the community (development of private property, weakening of the patriarchal, power in the family). Moreover, it thinks of the very meaning of the public through the traditional categories of the gentile. Therefore, for example, for the family morality, political forms other than monarchy are unthinkable. Archbishop Seraphim (Sobolev), clarifying the origin of power, quotes St. Philaret, Metropolitan of Moscow: “In the family are the beginnings and the first model of power and subordination, subsequently revealed in the large family – the state. It is the father who is… the first ruler”.[33] Substantiating the need for the autocratic nature of political power, Archbishop Seraphim writes: “Will any person, guided by the voice of reason and conscience, dispute the natural and divine right of the father to impose his will on his children, to demand from them the fulfillment and to punish them for violating it. Any restriction of the father’s will by the children, when it corresponds to the will of God, is nothing but a crime. The father’s power in relation to his children is autocratic”.[34]

Thus, we are dealing here with an extremely archaic notion, reducing the political in a quantitative sense to the order of the family and the lineage.[35] This reduction manifests itself in the political terminology of fundamentalism, where the complex of modern political concepts is replaced by the basic traditional categories of power, strength, authority and domination. If the authority of the father in the family is not recognized, he is free to resort to force. The mediating instances in which the essence of public life is located – law, the separation of powers and functions, institutions – do not exist in the worldview of fundamentalism. Interestingly, even the specificity of economic life, which in modernity is decisive in understanding society, cannot be achieved in fundamentalist thinking: the wealth of the nation is a function of its political power, and poverty is the result of the actions of enemies. The idea of ​​the opposite – that political significance can depend on economic successes and reforms – does not appear here. And indeed, the economic economy of the family and clan is a matter of organization, of authorities, and not of free (entrepreneurial) activity.

So, although fundamentalism manifests itself in many ways, its source, as has been shown, is in the indignation at “moral depravity and licentiousness.” And in this we must recognize the ethical correctness of fundamentalism and the tragedy of modernity. In a certain sense, moral fundamentalism is inevitable and necessary.

Fundamentalism and the Church

Just as the political narrative of fundamentalism is only a superstructure on its concern with moral-sexual issues, in a similar way it defends religion, starting ultimately from the same foundations. It finds in it the preserved taboos, myth and cult, which are contained in the social elements of tribal society. In other words, in religion it values ​​tradition, not living faith. Every religion is traditionalist insofar as it represents the historical and substantive root of the culture of peoples. Like a cultural embryo, it contains the genotype of past generations and, accordingly, the entire structures and forms of behavior in tribal societies. Here, religious doctrine acquires the features of myth, dogmatics – of taboo, worship – the characteristics of a cult. The Church is both hierarchical and in a certain way socially closed and with a syncretic traditionalist worldview. But this is not what makes it a Church, but the connection with God, the living mystical experience and the transcendental call. Finding in the Church a “social” and “worldview” ally, fundamentalism follows its call and assimilates it. But the important thing happens further: by perceiving the existing social “conservatism” of the Church, it reinterprets everything else in it. For it, the faith and life of the Church are an addition to the “social program”, and not the other way around. At first glance, this distortion of the Church’s message and its disastrous consequences for it are not noticeable: fundamentalists appropriate for themselves the role of zealots of the faith, missionaries, defenders of the Church from its enemies. And soon the confusions also appear: that in the Church which does not correspond to traditionalism is declared to be non-church. A war begins within the Church, waged with ferocity. Thus the Church is torn apart, if not externally, then from within. Further on, modernity itself, i.e. the outside world, is declared an adversary and enemy of the Church and war is declared against it in its name. The church hierarchy and the clergy, without noticing the substitution, perceive and take up the theses of fundamentalism. In response, the modern “outside world” with all the power of its institutions, mass media, culture and power attacks the ideology of traditionalism, behind which no longer stands a small group of fundamentalists, but the entire Church. The war between the Church and society begins.

Thus the Church is instrumentalized. The “guilt” of its sons lies in the fact that they themselves did not want to separate the essential from the non-essential in the church tradition, the social from the spiritual. They were deceived not only by the fundamentalists, but also by that archaic culture that has been “occulturized” and “churched” for centuries. The church is involved in the external struggle between traditional culture and modernity, which has its own logic and its own (non-religious) subject. Despite its task of further “churching” contemporary culture, it fights it and opposes it with all its authority. The end of this cultural clash is clear in advance: as examples, one can cite the clashes with the Social Democrats and with Bolshevism at the beginning of the 20th century. Today, the battle is being waged with the same tenacity against liberalism.

There is no need to explain that fundamentalism and the Orthodox Church are not identical.[36] It is difficult to imagine anything more opposite. The former is entirely human, secular, and historical—the Church is divine, heavenly, and eternal; the former is an ideology and organization, the latter a mystical body; the former is inherent in different cultures and religions—the Church has its Head and Truth in Jesus Christ and is fundamentally different from all other religions. The former is a religion of enmity, the latter a messenger of peace. Even the fundamentalist question of sexual morality has no theological or constitutive significance for the Church: man is a spirit, he is created, not born. It is even less concerned with the problems of modernity: the Church is eternal and cosmic, modernity is historical. The Church can join and merge with any era and offer each era its own path, independent of “the past and the transitory.”

Typology of Fundamentalism

A productive analysis would be to compare Orthodox fundamentalism with its other cultural types. This will help to position it and separate its specifics. In general, fundamentalism can be divided into religious and secular types. Among the religious types, we must distinguish between the fundamentalism of traditional religions and modern sects. We will begin with the place of Orthodox fundamentalism among traditional religions.

In relation to the types of Christian confessional fundamentalism, Orthodox is most clearly the specificity of the Eastern Christian tradition. If for Protestants the main collision between tradition and modernity is the threat to the Holy Scriptures from the modern scientific worldview and they focus on this cultural struggle,[37] then Catholicism identifies with its unique institutional structure and defends it first and foremost.[38] In this respect, it is more of a political nature, but at a time when the institutional basis of Catholicism is guaranteed in modern society, and fundamentalism is losing its relevance.[39] Since Orthodoxy has never treated Scripture rationally, nor has it possessed real institutional power over the state, the church would hardly be capable of effective cultural or political opposition. Here it focuses on something else – on traditions and Tradition. This is the most complex task possible, because, unlike Protestantism and Catholicism, the roots of Orthodoxy go back not to the beginning of the Modern Age or to the High Middle Ages, but to the early feudal era of late Hellenism and Byzantium. Therefore, on the one hand, the gnostic features and the cult-mythological sacralization of Hellenism, and on the other – the theocratic character of Byzantine political culture are clearly visible in it.[40] Here we have a much deeper conflict with modernity than in Scripture or in church organization. Moreover, for modernity, tradition is an exclusive object of opposition, and Orthodox fundamentalism assigns itself the historical task of defending tradition. And if in this struggle the church weakens, then for fundamentalism it is a way for its flourishing: the more the church separates itself from society, the stronger fundamentalism becomes in it.

The types of Christian “fundamentalism” oppose each other, although in psychological terms they understand each other. What “unites” them is the rejection of ecumenism. The single creed – belonging to Christianity – has no meaning for fundamentalism as a social phenomenon; rather, here the struggle is exacerbated. With Western Christianity it is even stronger because of its cultural and social influence and its proselytism. Even more acute, even sacral, opposition within the same tradition is towards Judaism, although here too the typological features of both fundamentalisms are similar: theocentrism and nationalism.[41] Conversely, Buddhist or Hindu fundamentalism, with which Christianity has neither theological nor cultural points of contact, are not a problem.[42] The attitude towards Islam is more complex. Orthodoxy is connected to Islamic fundamentalism by virtue of its theocentric worldview and due to certain communal imprints of the authoritarian socio-political structure of society. However, Orthodoxy remains far from the scale and radicality of Islam’s socio-religious program and its military-political activity.[43]

The classical fundamentalism of “traditional” religions is accordingly turned towards traditions. This is not the case in sectarianism. By its religious and social nature, a sect is primarily fundamentalism (in the same way, fundamentalism can be defined as sectarianism). By outlining its dogmatic basis and breaking away, as a rule, from some mother religion, the sect creates wonderful conditions for the identification of religious and social identity and for emphasizing it. However, modern sects are separated from the basic tradition, indeed, not by the spirit of traditionalism, but of modernism. Here, the idea of ​​radical renewal has priority. Although the sect also has tribal morality (without rejecting the religious call), for it tradition is burdensome and ineffective for its moral preaching. It combines the archaic and the modern without the mediation of tradition. As a rule, the sect offers a type of religiosity (rational preaching, modern language, effective emotional impact) that corresponds precisely to the “modern man” and easily fits the cultural-psychological structure of his personality. The consequences are a clearer program for the “religious masters”, a more vivid response, a more visible “religious transformation”. In the life of the sectarian, the sect occupies a much more significant place than the Church in the life of the ordinary Christian. In general, today, churches are losing followers more often, sects – vice versa.

In the light of what has been said, it becomes clear that in the clash between sectarianism and fundamentalism we have a meeting of two similar phenomena – the fundamentalism of modernity and tradition. They are united in their religious character and in their opposition to secular fundamentalism.[44] Secular fundamentalism, in turn, is divided into right-wing and left-wing extremism. Although the latter are ideological opponents and the left claims the role of the vanguard, both are united by their source and their goals – archaic tribal unity. In the Russian political space, their community is even more visible. Similarly, liberalism in its “fundamentalist” forms can be found mainly in Russia, including in the church. Although due to its principle of tolerance it is the least inclined to fundamentalism, it becomes such in its form when it is unrestricted by culture and meets the strong resistance of tradition.[45] In this form, it distorts the spirit of modernity. It should be noted, however, that liberalism is the most consistent in overcoming the archaic, which is why it also provokes the strongest aggression from all types of fundamentalism, including Orthodoxy.

What is common to all fundamentalisms is that they “skip” tradition, reproducing archaic structures and ideologies. It does not matter much whether this is done consciously or not, in the name of tradition or in the fight against it. For modern fundamentalisms (sects, liberalism) it does not represent a value, and the fundamentalism of traditional religions and political extremism profanes tradition, radicalizing it and turning it into its own opposite.[46]

Fundamentalism between modernity and postmodernity

The last topic that we will consider is the relationship of fundamentalism with modernity and postmodernity. It would be a mistake to conclude from this article that fundamentalism, including Orthodoxy, is a form of the archaic. On the contrary, it should be emphasized that, oriented towards tradition and fueled by the archaic, it is entirely a product and serves modern culture. In traditional societies in their own right, it could not exist, insofar as it is a destabilizing factor: the fate of sects in the Middle Ages can serve as an example. It would not even have arisen, since its identity is linked to the attitude towards modernity, not to “religious doctrine”. It is precisely modernity, with its destruction of traditions, that causes cultural shock, brings psychological dangers, changes the ethical foundations of society, etc., and gives rise to fundamentalism. Yet, for further clarity, we must make another distinction: between the forms of fundamentalism characteristic of modernity and the forms inherent in postmodernity.

In the modern era, it is a real struggle with tradition, which is why fundamentalism also has its serious political significance, but it is also more moderate and responsible. In essence, it merges with conservatism. The situation is completely different in postmodernity: tradition has been overcome and the attitude towards it is better. Fundamentalism is no longer able to influence the political system and adopts the most extravagant cultural forms – from mystical-occult to terrorist. Postmodernism is built on pluralism and the principles of tolerance: in culture, as well as in market relations, it strives for the realization of the entire spectrum of possibilities. Thus, it also creates a “systemic” place for fundamentalism, and by occupying it, fundamentalism simply fulfills the postmodern “project”. This is just another voice, another subculture, another “language game”. At the same time, torn apart by the large number of possibilities, postmodernism causes a deficit of seriousness, a spiritual vacuum. Filling this vacuum with its desperate gesture, fundamentalism gives postmodernity completeness, but precisely in its playful, “frivolous” forms. Postmodern fundamentalism simply profanes tradition: it resurrects it in memory, expelling it from life. For it, tradition is completely virtual: it is perceived not by reality, but by texts and turns into texts. By using the tools of technical civilization to propagate its ideas, it practically falls into the trap of this civilization: translation, but not content, form, not idea, determine its development. Criticizing the “feuilleton” era, it itself is incapable of producing anything other than slogans, feuilletons, rallies, websites. For it, serious discourse is impossible: for scientific work, for constructive dialogue, for consolidating action. Therefore, tradition is valuable for it in the form of the archaic, the exotic, the extravagant, the virtual. Like the primitivist artist, the fundamentalist discovers the archaic only as a source of new creative ideas and postmodern inspiration; as a way to kill tradition.

That is why it would be hasty to see in fundamentalism a defender of tradition and an opponent of postmodernity. In Russia, where the tasks of modernity have not yet been solved, fundamentalism is present in all its forms and in the most diverse combinations. And it is in Russia that Orthodox fundamentalism poses the greatest danger. As a fundamentalism from modernity, it acquires political forms, and as a postmodern fundamentalism, these forms acquire archaic, extremist content. Through its effective influence on the “average culture”, Orthodox fundamentalism turns out to be capable of changing the face of the entire political culture. Hence, it is very difficult to predict its further development. Under normal circumstances, according to the measure of its radicalization and its transition into the spaces of postmodernity, the Church should increasingly distance itself from it. The more radical it becomes, the more harmless it will be. However, there is another perspective: if the boundaries between the church and fundamentalism are not drawn, the latter will also drag the church into political sectarianism. As a powerful social institution, the church will hinder the modernization of the country. The conflict between the church and modernity will be inevitable.

From all that has been said above, one conclusion can be drawn – Orthodox fundamentalism is non-Orthodox. And if these reflections of ours help someone who has previously felt these problems to find rational arguments for themselves, the task of the article can be considered accomplished.

Notes:

[29] Monument of ancient Russian literature, a collection of instructions from the 16th century.

[30] The genus is everything, the individual is nothing. The life and laws of the gentile society have been studied well enough to prove this thesis here – see: Mehan, H., Wood, H. “Fünf Merkmale der Realität” – In: Ethnomethodologie, Hrsg. E. Weingarten, F. Sack, Frankfurt, 1976, pp. 53-58.

[31] Incest, and then extramarital relations, illegitimate children are subject to strict and often violent social control. It will suffice to say that even today the main content of forms of everyday communication such as “gossip” (“gossip”) is the sexual behavior of the individual.

[32] Nationalism thematizes the biological form of the extended family – the nation, communism – the social, the collective. Both are characterized by the strict principles of tribal morality. In its philosophy, fundamentalism follows the most natural path – it tries to reveal the roots of tribal morality in tradition. That is why, when communist and nationalist ideology are in crisis, they return to their sources, to religious fundamentalism, as happened in post-Soviet Russia. The entire history of the USSR itself represents the power of secular fundamentalism.

[33] Christian doctrine on the tsarist power from the sermons of Filaret, Metropolitan of Moscow, Moscow 1901, pp. 5-7.

[34] Seraphim (Sobolev), Archbishop. Russian ideology, St. Petersburg, 1994, p. 87. It should be said that this book by Archbishop Seraphim can in a certain sense also serve as a “Catechism” for Orthodox fundamentalism.

[35] It should be noted that even in ancient philosophy, for example, in Aristotle, family power (of the father), the power of the master (owner) and political power (of the monarch) were clearly distinguished. See: “Politics” – In: Aristotle, Collection of Works in Four Volumes, 3, Moscow 1984.

[36] It is worth noting the complex struggle between church power and fundamentalism today: more than once the Holy Synod published condemnatory definitions regarding Metropolitan John (Snichev): – in Rus’ Orthodox, etc. Contacts with church authorities are not smooth even in more moderate organizations of this type.

[37] Protestant fundamentalism still has a very strong position today. As Simpfendorfer notes, the anti-ecumenical International Council of Christian Churches (established in 1948 as a counterweight to the World Council of Churches) includes 480 Protestant churches (the WCC has 320, but they are large). See: Simpfendorfer, G. “Fromm in der säkularen Kultur: Fundamentalismus im Protestantismus” – In: Die neue Gesellschaft, Frankfurter Hefte, 36, 1989; cf. Ammerman, N. Bible believers, New Brunswick, 1988; Boone, K. The Bible tells them so, Albany, 1989; Neuhaus, R. Piety and politics, Washington, D.C. 1987; Aland, K. Der radikale Pietismus, Göttingen, 1983.

[38] The encyclical Syllabus (1864) is indicative of Catholic fundamentalism. Organizations accused of Protestantism include the movement of Bishop Marcel Lefebvre that broke away after the Second Vatican Council, the Catholic movement Opus Dei, the Polish Radio Maria, the Marxist-influenced movements of “liberation theology” and “political theology,” etc. See: Keating, K. Catholicism and fundamentalism, San Francisco, 1988; Beinert, W. “Katholischer” Fundamentalismus, Regensburg, 1991.

[39] After the Second Vatican Council, the danger of the strengthening of the influence of fundamentalist circles was completely eliminated.

[40] K. Leontiev, “father” of Russian traditionalism, clearly defines the two beginnings of Orthodox culture and “ideology”: Orthodoxy and the state – see: Leontiev, K. Byzantism and Russia, M. 1993.

[41] Schmitz, R. “Fundamentalismus und Ethik im Judentum” – In: Die Verdränge Freiheit, Hrsg., H. Kochanek, Freiburg, 1991.

[42] See: Lutt, J. “Der Hinduismus auf der Suche nach einem Fundament” – Ibid.

[43] Burrell, R. Islamic fundamentalism, London, 1989; Watt, W. Islamic fundamentalism and modernity, London, 1988; Scherer-Emunds, M. Die letzte Schlacht um Gottes Reich, Munster, 1989; Nirumand, B. Im Namen Allahs, Köln, 1990; Choueiri, Y. Islamic fundamentalism, Boston, 1990; Bjorkman, J. Fundamentalism, revivalists and violence in South Asia, New Delhi, 1988; Sowan, I. Radical Islam, New Haven, 1990; Kuckertz, B. Das grüne Schwert, München, 1992; Hyman, A. Muslim fundamentalism, London, 1985; Duran, K. Islam und politischer Extremismus, Hamburg, 1985.

[44] Scherf, H. “Fundamentalismus in der Ökonomie” – In: Merkur. Deutsche Zeitschrift für europäisches Denken, 46, 1992.

[45] Examples of uncritical liberal beliefs are often found in Russia. More classic forms are the 1968 movement, the German “Greens”, the alternative culture of the 1970s and 1980s. (We should note that they were all heavily influenced by Marxism.)

[46] Kostyuk, K. “Archaic and modern in Russian culture” – In: Sociological Journal, 2, 2000.

Source in Russian: Kostyuk, K. “Orthodox fundamentalism: social portrait and origins” – In: Polis, 5, 2000, pp. 133-154 / Костюк, К. „Православный фундаментализм: социальный портрет и истоки“ – В: Полис, 5, 2000, с. 133-154.