Orthodox Fundamentalism: Social Portrait and Sources (part 1)

By Konstantin Kostyuk

Among the social changes in the post-Soviet period, a phenomenon such as Orthodox fundamentalism has increasingly attracted attention. Due to the long atheistic tradition and the secular nature of Soviet society, it seemed impossible for something characteristic of the cultural transition from traditional to modern secular forms to emerge. However, the rapid development of Orthodox fundamentalism, which threatens to significantly encompass the entire Russian Orthodox Church, is already causing some confusion and anxiety in society. The almost complete lack of scientific literature on this issue in both domestic[1] and foreign studies[2] shows that a public attitude to this phenomenon has not yet been developed. In this article, we will try to make a brief overview of the history and development of Orthodox fundamentalism, focusing on the analysis of its ideological program, its social content, and its sources.

History and current state of Orthodox fundamentalism

The origin of the term “fundamentalism” dates back to the beginning of the 20th century with the appearance in the USA of a series of works under the title The Fundamentals: A Testimony to the Truth and the broad Protestant movement, marked by the ban on teaching Darwin’s theory of evolution in schools, by the so-called “monkey trials”, etc. The next wave of religious fundamentalism arose in the Islamic world in the 1970s in connection with the Islamic revolution in Iran. Today, this concept carries multidimensional political meanings in newspaper headlines, but it also has serious scientific dimensions, defining a complex of religious and ideological meanings, reflecting the protest of traditional cultures against the processes of modernization or simply pointing to fanatical-irrational and destructive behaviors such as extremism, terrorism, etc. Fundamentalism itself is not characteristic only of Islam, but also of Judaism, Hinduism, Protestant and Catholic Christianity, and with particular force – of new religious movements and sects. This concept has also begun to define purely secular phenomena: in social movements, such as far-left and far-right, ecological, feminist, alternative; in politics – Marxist and liberal fundamentalism, etc. [3] It should also be noted that some traditional cultures – for example, Buddhism, Confucianism, etc., do not give rise to research interest in terms of fundamentalist tendencies. Interest in Orthodox fundamentalism is also weak, but not because it does not exist, but because of the very small Orthodox area in the world. Most Orthodox countries in the 20th century, including Russia, followed an atheistic policy. At the same time, as we will see, the very foundations of Soviet culture and ideology were purely fundamentalist in nature.

The birth of Orthodox fundamentalism should be sought in the birth of fundamentalism in general, that is, in the early 20th century, if we do not look for its sources even further back, in the times of the schism. No less intensely than in the USA, Orthodox fundamentalism manifested itself both in public actions – the Jewish pogroms (1881, 1903), and at the political level with the creation of the “Union of the Russian People”.[4] At that time, its theorists also appeared – A. I. Dubrovin, V. A. Gringmut, Fr. Ioan Vostorgov, N. E. Markov, V. M. Purishkevich, Archimandrite Makariy (Gnevushev), Ig. Vitaly (Maksimenko), Archbishop Andronik (Nikolsky) and others. The Beilis case in 1911 is practically an analogue of the “monkey trials”, although it ended in defeat for its initiators. It would also be fair to note that Russian religious fundamentalism by that time had already been pushed aside by far more aggressive forms of political secular fundamentalism in the person of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Bolsheviks, who also practiced terrorist forms of struggle.

It seemed that a seventy-year religious pause would completely exclude the revival of religious fundamentalism, especially since the Orthodox Church had been destroyed, and the country had embarked on the path of industrial development. But already at the dawn of perestroika, together with the emergence of the famous “Memory” society, it became clear that religious-nationalist fundamentalism would serve as a significant political force participating in the reform of the political system. Traditionalism, the tendency towards “archaic recollection”, resurrecting pre-revolutionary traditions in memory, subsequently continued to develop in three directions: 1) an extremist-nationalist wing with an independent life; 2) a more cultural national-patriotic movement with Orthodox rhetoric was formed; 3) the Russian Communist Party also turned towards interaction and fusion with this ideological complex. Here we will be mainly interested in the fate of the second direction.

In the process of its development, many forces have combined. If at first the driving force of fundamentalism was anti-Semitism, preserved in the depths of Soviet culture, then later the independent religious meaning already prevailed. For its popularization, great importance was, first of all, certain religious-political concepts and, above all, the Orthodox monarchist movement with its idea of ​​an Orthodox monarchy. A certain role was also played by the emerging democratic Christian movement, which at some point adopted a national-traditionalist orientation, headed by V. Aksyuchits. From a political point of view, the church initially focused on dismantling the foundations of the Soviet system and in this sense acted anti-traditionalist – in particular, for example, it supported the liberal Law on Religious Organizations of 1991. However, at the moment when the framework of the new political order was being outlined in the “friendly” Russian state for the church, a movement in the opposite direction also began, culminating in the lobbying for the illiberal religious law in 1997. Against this background, complex internal structural processes also unfolded. As traditionalism increasingly gained strength, contradictions with other trends also intensified, thus the tensions between positions became chaotic and threatened the unity of the church. The official church authorities were forced to take into account the balance of power and begin a process of rapprochement with the strengthening traditionalism.[5] At a certain point, it chose the extreme of the compromise options, retaining a constructive character, but already producing a complex of conservative, anti-liberal ideas; this tendency became especially evident from the beginning of 1998 in the works of Metropolitan Kirill, dedicated to the criticism of liberalism.[6]

At the same time and despite all this, its own core of fundamentalist-oriented Orthodox circles was also formed. The ties with the pre-revolutionary religious and political culture were largely lost in the Russian Orthodox Church, but not in the Russian Church Abroad, which had preserved and even strengthened the traditionalist position and at first also helped to determine the attitude of the Russian Orthodox Church to the modern world (the works of Bishop Seraphim (Sobolev) and others). The literary activity of Metropolitan John (Snichev) of St. Petersburg and Ladoga was of great importance, serving as the basis for the construction of fundamentalism. In his numerous works, Metropolitan John energetically and talentedly developed the main complex of ideas and positions of Orthodox fundamentalism in relation to modernity and gave clear answers to a number of topical questions.[7] Authoritative conservative writers (V. Rasputin, N. Shafarevich, etc.), as well as the pre-revolutionary heritage (S. Nilus) supplemented the ideology of fundamentalism.

And here the need for organization arose. In this regard, the revived Orthodox press played a huge role. In the spirit of Leninist tradition, fundamentalist circles organized themselves around newspapers that defined the specifics of each of the trends. From the newspapers Rus’ pravoslavnaya (ed. K. Dushenov) and Rus’ derzhavnaya, expressing extremely radical and critical positions, to the newspapers Radonezh (ed. Nikiforov) and the television magazine Rus’ Dom (A. Krutov), ​​which were also engaged in constructive social actions (construction of schools, kindergartens, etc.). The ideological success of these publications was so high that for many in the Orthodox world they serve as a reference point for “Orthodoxy”. Most of the other publications only “soften” their theses, without giving up the same basic ideas. The informational success of this direction is evidenced, for example, by its undisputed dominance among Orthodox resources on the Internet. Its book publishing activity is also impressive.

We should not lose sight of its institutional development – ​​mainly in the form of Orthodox “brotherhoods” and religious-public organizations. Their spectrum is similar: from the odious “Orthodoxy or Death”, “Black Hundred”, “Society of Followers of Metropolitan John” and “Slavic World” to the respected “Union of Orthodox Citizens”, “Public Committee for the Moral Revival of the Fatherland” (A. Shargunov), the Christian-Patriotic Movement “Alexander Nevsky”, etc. Close to them are church-public organizations such as the Information and Consultative Center “Irinej Lyonsky” (A. Dvorkin) or the Orthodox Medical-Educational Center “Life”, which, without being fundamentalist in nature, repeat them to a significant extent in their critical pathos.

If we look at the results of the practical work and political influence of the aforementioned circles, they are not impressive. Everything that the fundamentalists have managed to do has been only in connection with the broader participation of church or “patriotic” forces. Such events include, for example, the defense of the White House (1993), the unrest over the banning of Scorsese’s film (1997), the public support for the Law on Religious Organizations (1997), the belligerent statements over the Kosovo crisis, intra-church scandals, “exposure” campaigns, etc. [8] Its political insignificance is the reason why Orthodox fundamentalism has not become the subject of more serious attention. Yet its influence within the church should no longer be underestimated. The decisions of the church leadership are largely made precisely under this influence. Under their pressure, a discussion began in the church about leaving the WCC and ceasing all ecumenical contacts; for the canonization of the royal family and for the official non-recognition by the church of the authenticity of their remains; under their influence, interdicts or official warnings against liberal priests are carried out; from there come the statements of the church authorities about the rejection of tax numbers, as well as sexual education in schools, etc. And in an informal sense this influence is much stronger than through the channel order. Higher church hierarchs, not excluding the patriarch, are subjected to real aggressive persecution, and in individual cases even to threats: it is enough to note only the most noticeable “targets” – Metropolitan Vladimir of St. Petersburg and Ladoga, Metropolitan Kirill of Smolensk and Kaliningrad, Metropolitan Filaret Minsky, etc.

The world of Orthodox fundamentalism is self-sufficient, complex, full of life and sufficiently intellectually and communicatively rich: a constant process of communion is underway in it, conferences, meetings, actions are organized, such as marches of bannermen, etc.

In order to gain a more differentiated idea, we should distinguish between active and passive fundamentalists: in the latter, these common understandings have not yet passed to the level of final convictions and actions. Fundamentalist views can also encompass various spheres: cult, theological, cultural, everyday, political. To one degree or another, the whole of church life is covered by these ideological moods, although here we must be cautious. This influence is fueled both by the saturation of everyday Orthodoxy with a multitude of beliefs and traditions (faith, apocalyptic expectations, belief in spirits, etc.), and by the almost complete monopolization by fundamentalists of the “criteria for Orthodoxy”.

In the public sphere, fundamentalist circles are usually united under the general concept of “zealots of piety”. It implies a specific attitude towards internal church reforms, the ideas of which – the translation of the liturgy into Russian, the transition to the new Julian calendar, etc. – were raised by liberal church circles. In practice, however, the “fundamentalism” of the “zealots of piety” does not consist in their ritual piety, but in their church-political program regarding “external” issues. What is common in this program is the uncompromising anti-ecumenism, blocking any form of religious dialogue. This is where traditional anti-Catholicism and especially anti-sectarianism are fed. Its next direction is the criticism of modernity and all its contents, related to contemporary forms of public life – human rights, democracy, the rule of law, market economy. On this ground, radical forms of anti-liberalism, anti-individualism and criticism of Western culture are unfolding. We can also note a third, political basis – statism, closely related to national-patriotic accentuation. After these general characteristics come the specific, more extreme radical concepts. In essence, metaphysical-mythological grounds are added to their initial theses. One of the most mythologized in this regard is anti-Semitism, united – strangely enough – with the theory of the Judeo-Masonic conspiracy. As in the puppet theater, the entire historical process is explained by the decisions of the leaders of the Masonic lodges and the secret organizations of the forces of evil. Other concepts are formed on the basis of the metaphysics of Orthodox monarchism and imperial statehood. It constitutes the “state of truth” and from this it bases its critique of modernity.[9] It is from this that myths are nurtured, such as that of the “Orthodox Stalin,” according to which only the Judeo-Masons prevented him from restoring the Orthodox monarchy in the USSR. This example, as well as many others – for example, the denial of the Jewish origin of Jesus Christ or of the Bible – show us to what extent “Orthodox fundamentalism” is blasphemous in relation to Orthodox Christianity. From this, too, the political, not religious, origin of fundamentalism is clearly visible.

This connection is further emphasized by the “external alliances” of these circles with the communists and nationalists. The idea of ​​the “Orthodox Stalin” became the official doctrine of the Communist Party,[10] and the Judeo-Masonic legend lives on in full force in the nationalist parties. In addition to church life, these connections are another channel for the political influence of fundamentalism. The differences between these social movements lie in their “programs” and rhetoric, but, as we will try to show, not in the contents of their value structure. Among the communists, the speech is secular, and among the nationalists, it is pagan, which does not at all prevent all three from being in solidarity with each other in “practical work”.

Let us now turn to the social basis of Orthodox fundamentalism.[11] It is multifaceted – groups that follow passive cult and theological fundamentalism, which fits entirely into “authentic” Orthodoxy, may practically have nothing in common with others that profess cultural and political fundamentalism. The most important role among the former is played by the highly respected “grandmothers”, to whose hearts, according to V. Rozanov, Orthodoxy appeals first and foremost.[12] Guardians of the rules of piety and conduct in the Church, they do not allow the cold air of the outside world into the temple and protect it from the winds of social change. The theologians of the old school act in more or less the same direction, struggling with all their might with the new theological trends.[13] The social support of “cult” fundamentalism are those parts of the clergy and monks who see no other ways of attracting the laity to the faith and of working with them than inside the temples. The levers for exercising spiritual power that remain in the hands of the clergy in relation to the laity have a cult, “tribnik” character, and this explains the relative cultural passivity and forced fundamentalism of the clergy. Cultural fundamentalism relies rather on the numerous neophytes who have flowed en masse into the Church over the last decade. Here, the intelligentsia plays a noticeable role, especially the technical one, when it goes beyond the mere external assimilation of “cultural” Orthodoxy. And only separate, rather narrow circles in the clergy and neophytes can be recognized as carriers of political fundamentalism, namely those who make attempts to justify political conclusions from cultural fundamentalism, while following pre-revolutionary traditions. The liberal (humanitarian) intelligentsia, people with higher education, are less represented in the church than on average in society,[14] which in turn weakens the anti-fundamentalist base in it.

Thus, the social basis of fundamentalism is those social strata that generally represent “active Christianity”. Another problem is that the “activity” itself in the church acquires the forms of cultural fundamentalism and leaves very little room for action for those who do not wish to join its ranks. The following parts of the text will be devoted to explaining the reasons for this.

Truth and Lies, the “Call” and “Response” of Fundamentalism

When defining a phenomenon as complex as fundamentalism, its substantive interpretations are usually avoided. In his working definition, D. Funke emphasizes its main intention: “Fundamentalism establishes a certain basic idea or value and takes it under comprehensive protection”.[15] Common to all types of fundamentalism are psychological and behavioral characteristics, style of thinking and worldview peculiarities. It should also be borne in mind that it is a type of cultural creativity, interpretation of phenomena and production of knowledge, distinguished by dogmatism, inability for dialogue and self-criticism. In this sense, “Orthodoxy” is fundamentalist by definition – it is ortho doxa, “correct faith”,[16] it is based on and defends theological dogmas and principles of faith. Because of its dogmatic foundations, it tends to dogmatize any content and to be relatively intolerant and radical. Based on tradition, it is often criticized for its “natural” conservatism and traditionalism. Here, however, a clear line must be drawn between the attachment of any cultural entity to its own foundations (principles and adherence to them also exist in science, in religion, in the state and in every social group) and the way in which fundamentalism does this.[17] It is constitutive of the conflict with modernity, and not simply some external, formal signs.[18] It is on this conflict and its specific forms in religious (Orthodox) fundamentalism that we will focus our attention here.

Literature, including Western literature, does not take into account the spiritual charge and content of fundamentalism. However, it is precisely these that make it attractive to people. Only the deaf will not hear the call for spiritual awakening and revival, which is the pathos of the fundamentalist message. Fundamentalism is born from the thirst for true Christianity, for overcoming the formal, the “dormant”. It is also necessary to take into account the context in which fundamentalist emotions arise – the rapid cultural secularization, the loss of traditional forms of life and values, the decline in interest in faith and religious life, the relativization of moral consciousness. Let us try to determine the positive in the program that fundamentalism offers.

1. Theocentrism. The “zealous for piety” oppose the relativization and weakening of faith in the church and in society with strict and consistent theocentrism. Not only should all life and all thoughts be dedicated to God, but also social existence, social ethics should be organized in His service. Religious fundamentalism is rightly called “political worship”. To the era of “forgetting God” he contrasts the era of “remembering God”.

2. Piety. The loss of faith results from the relativization of cult and ritual life in the church. Attempts to make this life more modern, “accessible”, “understandable” for modern man, as a result lead to the secularization of religious life. The change of forms brings with it a loss of identity, a change of the very object of faith: another faith is proclaimed, different gods are worshipped. It is not religious life that must adapt to the changes of time, on the contrary – the social structure must correspond to the fundamental tenets of faith!

3. Sacred Tradition and tradition. The life of the Church consists in the continuity and in the connecting power of the divine Tradition, which in previous, better times encompassed all aspects of public life. Through the unity of the national tradition, the connection with the Tradition, with the true Orthodox sources, is preserved. Without this connection, the grace and integrity of religious and national existence are lost. The preservation of tradition in all its aspects is one of the key tasks of religious life.

4. The truth of Scripture and the Holy Fathers. This truth is constantly forgotten or undermined in our lives. Vain reasoning obscures it, regardless of whether it originates from the godless human mind, or from attempts to distort the truth in modern theological interpretations. The preservation and preaching of the pure and literal divine commandments in modern life is the task of the Christian.

5. Virtue and chastity. In modern times, new opportunities and new temptations arise, against which human nature is difficult to defend. The weakening of traditional morality, the flourishing of consumer culture, the decay of sexual morality, the “public approval” of phenomena such as prostitution, homosexuality, marital infidelity, etc. cannot leave the moral consciousness of the believer indifferent. In opposing the moral decay of society, the moral protest of fundamentalism discovers its vital juices.

6. Good and evil, truth and falsehood. The spiritual gaze clearly sees the boundaries between good and evil, truth and falsehood. Moral decline – and there is no more accurate criterion for spiritual health – testifies to the immediate proximity of its source – evil, the human Enemy. Faith teaches us that there can be no compromise between good and evil, between God and the devil. We should not make such a compromise in our lives. Good must be served and it is worth fighting for.

7. The Christian state – a monarchy of conscience. Man has sinned and with him has destroyed the world. But the Lord has destined that good and truth should reign in the world and in man. The substance of good in man is conscience, and in the world – the just king. Like the one Monarch in heaven, in the same way a monarch is needed in this sinful world, whose concern is to make it Christian. The Orthodox state, such as Russia already was, is not a utopia, but a need for the Christian spirit, which does not reconcile itself with the power of spirituallessness in modern political life.

8. The people and the homeland. The feeling for the homeland and for unity with the people of the ancestors is a feeling as holy as love for the mother. Russia has been and remains the place where the Truth, albeit among a few “faithful,” is preserved and will be preserved. Because of this, Russia is also the main target of the enemies of the Truth and a victim in the inevitable spiritual battle. The Russian people – the guardian of Orthodoxy, the “herald of salvation,” will be persecuted and will suffer much in the name of God.

The above – fidelity to God and Tradition, piety and virtue, understanding the boundaries between good and evil, even the idea of ​​the Christian state – is not yet fundamentalist in itself. However, even here those characteristics of theonomic metaphysics are clearly visible, from which the fundamentalist worldview arises. Its roots are in the syncretic and even mystical experience of the totality of being and the omnipotence of divine Providence. This worldview goes back to the foundations of Orthodox theology. “There is one Lord,” writes Theodore the Studite, “and lawgiver, as it is written: over all there is one power and one Godhead. This one-dominion is the source of all wisdom, goodness and beneficence, extending over all, having its beginning in the goodness of God… and in the likeness of God it is given to man alone to order his life according to his will… And if the will of one does not rule over all, there will be no order and order anywhere and it will not be for good, because discord destroys everything.”[19] That which exists is under the direct divine power, and that which is de-existent is under the power of evil.[20] That which exists is hierarchical and filled with the energies of the secret angelic powers. Good is substantial and absolute, already ready and complete, and needs only to be embodied in being.

In its intentions, this worldview is strictly monistic, and the more straightforward this monism is, the more radically Manichaean dualism emerges from it.[21] In this dialectic, the realm of Evil – and this is our world – is a mirror image of the realm of Good: it too has a power and hierarchy, it is filled with secret forces and permeated with energies, the evil in it is substantial and omnipotent. This world is completely complete, development is not inherent to it, it already is; it does not need to be revealed, it is already known. In the Gnostic world, the Gnostic becomes his double: he knows evil, which is why he is a partaker of it. From now on, his life’s task is to fight Evil and expose it in the name of Good. There is no time left for a life in good.

In the closed gnostic-fundamentalist worldview, as nowhere else, the mythologizing factor is leading, since procedures for checking the “initiates” are not provided for.[22] This is the next characteristic of fundamentalism. All the lines of events here are mythologized in advance and not much effort is needed to include any specific fact in them. In Orthodox fundamentalism, apocalyptic and demonological mythology are of paramount importance. Historical mythology, related, for example, to the idea of ​​the Zionist conspiracy or the mission of Russia, also easily fits in. The patristic heritage and Scripture are mythologized, not studied.

In fundamentalism, it is easy to find irrational and anti-intellectual characteristics that exclude the possibility of reflection on its foundations. This is the very essence of fundamentalism – to leave faith untouched by reason. In the same way that Protestant fundamentalism arose with the emergence of theological criticism of Scripture, so Orthodoxy came with liberal theology.[23] It is not capable of intensive theological development, but only extensive. In its arguments – revealing contradictions with the foundations, violations of the canon – it is similar to positivism.[24] Therefore, fundamentalism is theologically and apologetically sterile, but it can be quickly mobilized for a mission, for the “defense of the faith”. Living in a sacralized world, it is nevertheless not mystical and contemplative. The fundamentalist insists on being a “warrior of the Church”. He lives with a sense of duty and is disposed to action.[25]

In irrational mytho-metaphysical thinking, in the absence of a sense of self-criticism and creativity, something very serious can be discovered – the dysfunctions in contemporary culture and the manifestation of its archaic forms oriented towards statics. The European culture of the Modern Age and the Enlightenment starts from reflection and criticism, from the demythologisation and secularisation of the picture of the world, from doubt, (self)irony and laughter, freeing man from myth and statics. This is to a large extent inherent in Christian culture in general: faith presupposes a personal relationship with God and hence the constant development of one’s own personal attitude, enriching both self-knowledge and knowledge of God. This is also the phenomenon of history: man, reflecting and changing his perception of himself, changes himself. Changing his image, to a certain extent he develops through theology and his understanding of God.

This is not what we will find if we turn to archaic pagan thinking. The mechanisms of self-criticism are taboo here. The place of faith is taken by the cult, immersing man in the power of myth and ritual, mediating and replacing through them the possibility of a personal relationship with the deity. There are no doubts about God, but there is no knowledge of God. The image of God does not change, but the image of man does not change either. There is no history, no development, and to a large extent no knowledge arises. Facts accumulate and are considered in connection with the beginning and values, but they do not change or influence the deepening of knowledge about the beginning itself. There are no “cultural revolutions” (by analogy with T. Kuhn’s “scientific revolutions”), civilizational transitions. If the archaic thinking, closed in on itself, had remained dominant, then such turning points in human history as the emergence of Christianity, as well as other world religions, would have been impossible.

Let us imagine that the closed archaic worldview collides with another, more developed one. The culture unprepared for reflection collapses like a house of cards: many facts cannot be explained by its own principles. If it manages to master these facts by assimilating the foundations of a foreign culture, its own become unnecessary. In place of the archaic world comes archaic chaos. Examples of such a transient painful state today we have in the countries of the third world. However, the same thing happens in more developed cultures. Only this time the conflicts arise between regions of its own culture – subcultures – some have gone too “forward” and others have “been behind”. In the normal case, culture works on mediating them, but sometimes it happens that it cannot withstand the tension. Then both the entire culture – into the abyss of totalitarianism or dictatorship – and the subculture in the “dead end” of fundamentalism can collapse.

If the fundamentalist subculture abandons dialogue and switches to a regime of war, of preserving the traditional foundations of culture, it voluntarily excludes itself from living culture and marginalizes itself. Psychological and moral overloads increase many times over, because it defends values ​​that are no longer inherent in society, and it cannot rely on it. The effect of psychological crisis and disintegration in the psychic structure of the personality arises. Analyzing the phenomenon of fundamentalism, psychologist D. Funke notes that this type of psyche unites within itself the schizoid and compulsive structure (zwangshafte Personlichkeit) of the personality.[26] The schizoid is distrustful of the world, is self-centered and autonomous, is alien to self-reflection and self-criticism, but wants security and safety, is inclined to create “scapegoats” for himself. The obsessive type, on the contrary, is afraid of independence, seeks to free himself from his own desires and needs, tries to completely adapt and fit into the system of external values, attitudes and authorities. In both cases we have a breakdown in the polar structure of the personality, implying the balance between “I” and “not-I”, between safety and independence. In the individual development of the fundamentalist, the age transition from the stage of safety, associated with the infantile feeling of unity between the child and the mother, to the stage of safety, associated with the understanding of personal autonomy, does not take place. Fears for one’s own safety, the feeling of being surrounded by enemies give rise to aggression. “In fundamentalism, the tip of the iceberg of ‘sadness for safety’ becomes visible… In times of affective and cognitive uncertainty, associated with severe cultural decay, archaic forms of security are activated at the expense of the equilibrium balance between the poles… In essence, fundamentalist theories are aimed at proclaiming some ultimate great harmony, where culture and nature, subject and object, man and creation are interconnected in an all-encompassing unity. It is not the hope for personal development and opportunities, but the belief in one’s place in the interconnected, problem-free cosmos that helps… compensate for the loss of confidence in the future.”[27] Adapting to this mental anomaly, the fundamentalist community becomes a center of attraction for psychologically unstable individuals, who find opportunities for adaptation here and find many “like-minded people”. Of course, fundamentalism can in no way be reduced to a “medical” problem. However, it is precisely thanks to the cultural-psychological reaction that the considered logical-metaphysical premises are activated. Even a simple enumeration of the groups that make up the social basis of fundamentalism reveals their marginal character: “grannies” are “marginal” by age, “theologians” – in relation to the secularly formed channels for transmitting knowledge in society (science and media), “monks” are voluntary anchorites, “clergy” is marginal to the “world of professions”. By definition, “neophytes” are also marginal. And in general, our society, which has experienced a radical collapse of the social and value system, can be defined as marginal. In such conditions, the “marginal” ideology has the greatest chances of success.

Having examined the contents of some socio-cultural processes, in whose depths fundamentalism is born, the question arises: in what way is the spiritual challenge that gives rise to fundamentalism translated into the language of these marginal social groups, torn apart by the conflict between tradition and modernity, mired in Gnostic-Manichean metaphysics? In contrast to the “spiritual”, the “practical” program of Orthodox fundamentalism is already laid down here.

1. Theocentrism – metaphysics of anti-pluralism. The transfer of the idea of ​​theocentrism to the field of culture delegitimizes the autonomy of cultural areas. Cultural activity, which by its nature is not placed in direct or indirect service to God, is deprived of the right to exist. Man becomes a sinful being par excellence: any work of his for his own good is illegitimate. The entire socio-cultural structure, as well as the cultural development of modern society, are also rejected.

2. Piety – ritualism. The forms of Orthodox piety must remain untouched, even if no one understands and professes them anymore. The destroyers of piety and traditions are the most dangerous internal enemies of the Church. Holy Orthodoxy should not be dependent on people who may be unfaithful and sinful.

3. Fidelity to Tradition – traditionalism. Imperatives and rules for cultural construction with an “authentic” Orthodox character can be found only in Scripture and tradition. The distinction between Holy Scripture and cultural-historical tradition has been removed. Everything in history that deviates from it – and this is modernity – is illegitimate. The meaning of cultural work is to hinder the development of modernity.

4. Fidelity to Scripture – rejection of the sciences and theology. The Scriptures and the Fathers of the Church are those textual sources in which all the necessary principles of cultural construction have already been formulated. Following the signal fires of tradition, it remains only to arrange them and organize them into a program for concrete work: an Orthodox state, an Orthodox economy, an Orthodox culture. This program must be opposed both to secular cultural texts in science and their other forms, and above all to the distortions of the Orthodox cultural heritage – to modern (liberal) theology.

5. Moralism – aggression and rejection of culture. The social way out of the crisis is carried out (and limited) through moral revival. Desecrated morality must be restored in the fight against the corrupting modern (liberal) ideology of “freedom” and permissiveness. All instruments of debauchery – from televisions and computers to their source – the spiritless world of individualism and money, i.e. modernity, must be cursed.

6. Distinguishing between good and evil – a black and white image of the world. That which is not good is evil. Everything that is not with God and the Church obeys the devil. That which does not serve the divine order is doomed to non-existence. The Christian attitude towards this is a fight to the death.

7. Christian state – monarchical totalitarianism. Modern political forms – democracy, the rule of law, market economy, civil society – destroy the idea of ​​an Orthodox state and are an invention of the Evil One, primarily to destroy Russia. The instrument for this is the aggressive West, led by the USA. The state unity of Russia under the scepter of an autocrat, subject only to the moral law and pursuing debauchery and permissiveness, is the only moral and true political system. Only in these conditions is the complete elimination of the “liberal turmoil” and the salvation of Russia realistic.

8. Patriotism – racism and nationalism. The weapon of Satan and the enemy of Russia is known – this is the Jewish people, who crucified the Savior. His secret work for the complete conquest of the world with the help of world Freemasonry is practically completed – all financial and political power is concentrated in one hands. The last point in this program is the destruction of Russia and the destruction of Orthodoxy. This struggle is waged through the Russophobic liberals, who, with perestroika and reforms, robbed the Russian people and turned them into paupers and slaves. True patriotism consists in the restoration of the imperial power of Russia and in the fight against the Russophobes, to whom the intelligentsia and the majority of the political elite belong.

If in this “executive program”, which can be designated as a maximum program in relation to the “spiritual” minimum program, many details are omitted, the main thing is not omitted – the leitmotif of the struggle, the sacred “gasavat”.[28] The individual “spiritual” tasks outline the lines of the front and allow the image of the “enemy” to be recognized. If the “spiritual” program represented a radicalization of the demands for the Christianization of culture, then in the “practical” program for the realization of these demands, the very basic principles of Christianity are “suddenly” rejected: cultural construction (1), the ministry of the Church “in the world” (2), theology (4), human freedom (5), love (6), cosmism and the internationality of the Church (8). Instead, totalitarianism (1, 7), racism (8), imperialism (7, 8) are sanctified. Hatred – regardless of the all-pervading moralism – becomes something like a “spiritual eye”. Man – as a completely sinful being – is cursed, but the tradition that this man has created is sanctified. This is how we arrive at the moral and theological justification for the release of the archaic elements, the embodiment and celebration of which is the Jewish pogrom – the “archetype” of fundamentalism.

Notes:

[1] Among the authors making systematic efforts on the subject, we can point out S. Filatov (Filatov, S. “New birth of an old idea: Orthodoxy as a national symbol” – In: Polis, 3, 1999); ig. Veniamin Novik (Veniamin (Novik), ig. Orthodoxy, Christianity, Democracy, St. Petersburg, 1999; Novik, V.N. “Historical-analytical view of Russian Orthodoxy” – In: Orthodoxy and Catholicism: social aspects, M.: INION, 1998, etc.); M. Sitnikov (Sitnikov, M. “Iskusheniya nashego veka” – In: Church-Public Gazette, 7.10.97, etc.); A. Kirlezhev (Kyrlezhev, A. “Church and Pluralism” – In: Church-Social Bulletin, 23, 1997, etc.). See also: Religion and Politics in Post-Communist Russia, Moscow 1994; Kasyanova, K. “Religious Fundamentalism” – In: On the Russian National Character, Moscow, 1994. Interestingly, there are hundreds of works on this issue in the Soviet era, dedicated to Orthodoxy. However, despite everything, none of them has any real value. The thing is that all of them, as a rule, were written from fundamentalist positions, namely from the point of view of “scientific atheism” (Osipova, L.F. Critique of the religious-idealistic concept of the development of public life, 1974 (dissertation); Pitelinskaya, N. Dogmatic traditionalism and tendencies of modernism in modern orthodox theology, M. 1967; Rebkalo, V.A. Traditionalism and modernism in modern orthodox богословской концепции человека, Kyiv, 1979; Bazhanova, I. M. Unity of traditional and modern Orthodoxy in interpretations of social phenomena, M. 1979).

[2] Some more general texts: Cole, S. The history of fundamentalism, Westport, CT, 1971; Barr, J. Fundamentalismus, Munich, 1981; Evans, R. Fundamentalism, LaSalle, IL, 1988; Marsden, G. The fundamentals, N. Y., p. a.; Meyer, T. Fundamentalismus, Reinbek bei Hamburg, 1989; Meyer, T. Fundamentalismus in der modernen Welt, Frankfurt am Main, 1989; Colpe, C. Religioser Fundamentalismus, Berlin, 1989; Kienzler, K. Der neue Fundamentalismus, Düsseldorf, 1990; Cohen, N. The fundamentalist phenomenon, Gr. Rapids, MI, 1990; Pfurtner, S. Fundamentalismus, Freiburg, 1991; Kunneth, W. Fundamentalismus?, Neuendettelsau, 1990; Marty, M. Fundamentalisms observed, Chicago, 1991; Caplan, L. Studies in religious fundamentalism, Albany, 1987; Straton, J. Fundamentalist versus modernist, N.Y. 1988; Schäfer, H. Befreiung vom Fundamentalismus, Munster, 1988. Individual aspects: Riesebrodt, M. Radikaler Patriarchalismus, 1989; Idem. Fundamentalismus als patriarchalische Protestbewegung, Tübingen, 1990; Deinzer, K. Sicherheit um jeden Preis?, St. Ottilien, 1990; Birnstein, U. Gottes einzige Antwort…, Wuppertal, 1990; Gitt, W. Logos oder Chaos, Neuhausen-Stuttgart, 1985; Hiro, D. Holy wars, N.Y. 1989; Lawrence, B. Defenders of God, San Francisco, 1989; Hadden, J. Secularization and fundamentalism reconsidered, N.Y., NY, 1989; Kammann, H.-H. Religiose Sozialisation unter Bedingungen fundamentalistisch orientierter Milieus, 1988; Broer, I. Offenbarunganspruch und fundamentalistische Versuchung, Freiburg im Breisgau, 1991; Rohr, E. Die Zerstörung kultureller Symbol Gefüge, München, 1991; Kepel, G. Die Rache Gottes, Munich, 1991; Hemminger, H. Fundamentalismus in der verweltlichten Kultur, Stuttgart, 1991; Youssef, M. Revolt against modernity, Leiden, 1985; Beck, H. Biologie und Weltanschauung, Neuhausen b. Stuttgart, 1979.

[3] See Howard, V. B. Religion and the radical Republican movement, Lexington, KY: The University Press of Kentucky, 1990.

[4] See: Stepanov, A. “Pravda o chernoi sotne” – In: Rus’ Pravoslavnaya, 2, 1999.

[5] An example of the growing power of fundamentalism can be served by the devastating criticism that followed the speech of Moscow Patriarch Alexy II to the Jewish community in the USA in 1991.

[6] Kiril (Gundyaev), miter. “Obstyatelstva new time: Liberalism, traditionalism and moral values ​​of unifying Europe” – In: Nezavisimaya Gazeta, NG-religii 26.05.99; From the same author, “Norm of faith as norm of life: The problem of the relationship between traditional and liberal values ​​in the selection of individuals and societies” – VIII International Christmas Educational Readings, Moscow, February 7-9, 2000.

[7] John, (Snichev), miter. Sermons, St. Petersburg. 1992; From the same author – Autocracy of the spirit; Rus’ sobornaya, St. Petersburg. 1994; Orthodoxy. Army. State. Collection of articles, St. Petersburg. 1995.

[8] Among the latter we can include the burning of books by liberal theologians by Bishop Nikon of Yekaterinburg (1998), the booing of Metropolitan Vladimir of St. Petersburg for his statements on the church calendar (1997), the criticism, including the interdict, of liberal priests (Father A. Borisov, Father G. Chistyakov, Father G. Kochetkov, Archimandrite Zenon, etc.), the denunciations of “ecumenical” hierarchs, etc.

[9] Lux, L. Russia between West and East, M. 1994.

[10] Zyuganov, G. Faith and faithfulness, M. 1999.

[11] Mchedlov, M. “Faith of Russia in the mirrors of statistics: Population of our country about the XX century and about its hopes for the coming century” – In: Nezavisimaya Gazeta, NG-religii, May 17, 2000; Klyamkin, I., Kutkovets, T. Russian ideas, Polis, 2, 1997, pp. 118-137.

[12] “Russian Church” – In: Rozanov, V. In dark religious places, M. 1995.

[13] See: Unity Church, M. 1994 (conference); Seti “renewed Orthodoxy”, M. 1995; Modern renewal – Protestantism of the “Eastern Rite”, Moscow 1996.

[14] According to the research of I. Klyamkin, the percentage of people with higher education – 9% – in the church is lower than in society: Klyamkin, I., Kutkovets, T. Cited by others

[15] Funke, D. “Das halbierte Selbst: Psychische Aspekte des Fundamentalismus” – In: Fundamentalismus in den Kirchen, Hrsg. H. Kozhanek, Freiburg, 1991, p. 83.

[16] “Proper opinion”.

[17] Beinert, W. Katholischer Fundamentalismus, Regensburg, 1991, p. 63.

[18] The history of the Orthodox Church is characterized by its deep conflict with modernity, which has not been overcome to this day. A significant factor in this regard is its inability to perceive and respond to the Enlightenment impulse of secular culture. However, the Orthodox Church is not original in this: the same is characteristic of other Christian denominations, albeit in milder versions. See: Kitromilides, P. Enlightenment, Nationalism, Orthodoxy: Studies in the Culture and Political Thought of Southeastern Europe, Norfolk, 1994.

[19] Dobrotolyubie, 4, Moscow 1901, p. 93.

[20] Due to the ambiguity in the translation into Bulgarian of the opposition “subsisting – non-existent”, the term “unsubsisting” is used (translator’s note).

[21] Dualism is even more pronounced in radical attempts to emphasize the “insignificance of nothingness,” to remove the source of evil from the sphere of the divine. In the problem of the substantiality of nothingness, the boundary between monistic Neoplatonism and dualistic Manichaeism is much thinner than is usually presented (Plotin, On the Causes of Evil – Historical and Philosophical Yearbook, Moscow 1991).

[22] In its classical version (among the followers of Valentinian), Gnosticism acquires particularly distinct Manichaean characteristics, when evil, creation, and power over the “present aeon” are attributed to the Demiurge. Even in the era of Christian theology (“Christian”) Gnostics fail to make the transition from theogonic myth to rational theology. See: Losev, A. F. Aesthetics of Antiquity, 6, Moscow 1993.

[23] An example of one of the first clashes of this nature can be the episode with the “literary persecution” (V. Rozanov) against Archimandrite Theodore (Bukharev) by the conservative writer V. I. Askochensky. See: Florovsky, G. Paths of Russian Theology, Vilnius, 1991, pp. 344-248; “Aksochensky and Archimandrite Theodore Bukharev” – Rozanov, V. Around the Church Walls, Moscow 1995, pp. 241-263.

[24] This feature is well noted by G. Florovsky in Pobedonostsev: “There is something of positivism in this irreconcilable withdrawal of Pobedonostsev from all reasoning… And when he speaks of faith, he has in mind the faith of the people, and not so much the faith of the Church… namely the “simple” faith, i.e. intuition or feeling, a kind of instinct, the notorious “coal miner’s faith” (Florovsky, G. Cit. soch., pp. 410-411).

[25] Kasyanova writes about religious fundamentalism: “… abstract reflections on God and one’s own soul, unusual mystical experiences, attempts at creative intervention in worldly affairs and in relationships between people – all this can be left in the background and in the background, drowned out by strong emotions regarding the fulfillment or non-fulfillment of one or another specific religious prohibition, rule, norm… There is no clearly expressed religious intuition in it” (“Religious fundamentalism” – In: Kasyanova, K. On the Russian National Character, Moscow 1994, pp. 194-196).

[26] Funke, D. Op. cit., pp. 84-85.

[27] Ibid., pp. 87-88.

[28] Jihad, holy war.

Source in Russian: Kostyuk, K. “Orthodox fundamentalism: social portrait and origins” – In: Polis, 5, 2000, pp. 133-154 / Костюк, К. „Православный фундаментализм: социальный портрет и истоки“ – В: Полис, 5, 2000, с. 133-154.