Last August, as president-designate of the 11th Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT RevCon) to be convened later this month, I attended the commemoration of the 80th anniversary of the atomic bombing in Hiroshima.
Coming from Vietnam, to me the legacy of war and destruction is deeply personal. Yet, there is a singular, haunting power in the images in Hiroshima: entire neighborhoods incinerated, the shadow of a man etched permanently into stone steps, and anguished figures of women and children with their skin peeled, hanging. These images transcend an individual experience. They are seared into humanity’s collective memory.
Indeed, few events over the past century have shaped the world’s understanding of war and human survival as profoundly and systematically as the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
Thankfully, through some combination of primal fear, a fragile international security architecture, restraint, and luck, those remain the only instances of nuclear weapons used in conflict.
The NPT was born at the height of the Cold War, when governments were still engaged in a costly nuclear arms race and subscribed to mutually-assured destruction (MAD) policies. Since 1970 the treaty has been the cornerstone of a nuclear order that limits the spread of nuclear weapons, facilitates reductions in nuclear warheads, and establishes the framework for the expansion of peaceful use of nuclear energy.
Yet, over recent decades, nuclear dangers have seemingly lost salience in the global agenda. Beneath this lies a deeply troubling inversion of logic: the fear of the catastrophic destructive power of nuclear weapons is being supplanted by a misguided fear of not having them – either independently or under a “deterrence umbrella.”
The idea of using nuclear weapons to achieve absolute dominance on the battlefield, once confined to the most extreme scenarios in classified war plans, has been normalized in mainstream discourse, dangerously eroding the “nuclear taboo.”
For the first time in decades, it is reported that every NPT-recognized nuclear-weapon state – China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States – is actively modernizing and expanding their nuclear arsenals. The role of nuclear weapons has been elevated in some of these states’ security policies. With the expiration of the New START Treaty in February, the inspections and verification that once provided transparency, predictability, and mutual confidence have ceased.
At its core, this crisis is also one of trust. A profound deficit has corroded the very foundations of international cooperation. International law is seen as binding only on the weak, while the powerful act with impunity. Sovereignty and territorial integrity are treated as negotiable. Nuclear powers neglect their disarmament commitments while demanding that others uphold non-proliferation obligations. Non-nuclear-weapon states grow ever more skeptical of a regime they perceive as fundamentally discriminatory.
Against this backdrop, states face a choice between two fundamentally different paths.
The first follows the current trajectory: governments invest billions to strengthen nuclear weapons capabilities and expand their extended deterrence arrangements, which precipitates competition that ultimately results in diminished security for all. This path assumes the world can be pushed repeatedly to the brink of nuclear use and rely on rational actors to exercise restraint before it is too late. It is less a strategy than a wager on perpetual luck.
An alternative path is less dramatic but more demanding and requires the slow and often tedious work of diplomacy. But as history demonstrates, the demanding work of dialogue and trust-building can be effective in negotiating mutually beneficial restraints and forging solid foundations for long-lasting stability.
The upcoming NPT RevCon will provide a venue for such dialogue.
Every five years, states gather to debate progress that has been made in implementing the treaty and what more should be done going forward.
As with many multilateral processes, the conference can at times appear ritualistic. Yet this very ritual serves a purpose: a public affirmation of the continued relevance of the NPT as the reference point for nuclear governance. Absent such affirmation – in the form of a consensus outcome document – for the third consecutive time since 2015, the treaty’s legitimacy and credibility would be called into question.
This is the risk looming over the RevCon.
It would be unrealistic to expect the conference this year, held in probably the most challenging time in the history of the NPT, to resolve the underlying strategic rivalries of our time. But a balanced outcome document that reaffirms core commitments and sets out some practical steps forward would strengthen the integrity of the NPT and convey the continued shared commitment to and relevance of the treaty.
That may sound modest, but inaction is not an option, and failure cannot be normalized simply because it has happened before.
States Parties must begin with honest and sober reflections on what is at stake, and what a world without an effective, functioning NPT regime would look like. In all likelihood, it would be one where regional rivalries increasingly have nuclear dimensions, where the taboo against nuclear use erodes further, and where collective security is diminished by the potential spread of nuclear weapons whether to friends or adversaries.
Delegations should arrive prepared for substantive and constructive debates rather than ritualized blame. Pointing fingers at one another, without recognizing that our own actions are part of the problem, is easy. But that is neither helpful nor sufficient to the moment.
What is needed is a willingness to compromise, to recognize shared interests, and to identify specific measures that can realistically be implemented within the next review cycle. Progress on confidence-building measures, steps to avert nuclear war, increased transparency, and advancing the peaceful use of nuclear technology are realistic goals that do not require the prior resolution of all underlying political disputes.
As architects and custodians of the nuclear order, the nuclear-weapon states bear particular responsibility, and must acknowledge the deep frustration among non-nuclear-weapon states at the lack of progress on disarmament commitments. Leadership from nuclear powers means understanding the security concerns of others rather than dismissing them. It means offering meaningful assurances, demonstrating restraint, and pursuing serious dialogue among themselves to reduce the risks of miscalculation that could prove catastrophic for everyone.
The NPT emerged from the recognition that in a nuclear age, security is indivisible. No nation, no matter how powerful, can insulate itself from the consequences of nuclear Armageddon, and the belief that safety lies in accumulating ever more destructive capacity offers only the illusion of security.
The diplomatic path is demanding, often frustrating, and rarely produces the dramatic breakthroughs that capture headlines, but it remains the only path that does not court catastrophe.
As presiding officer of the 11th NPT Review Conference, I am under no illusion that we can expect a smooth sailing. But I refuse to believe that the international community has reached a point of no return.
So come April 17, as we gather to deliberate the fate of this treaty, and in many ways, the fate of our planet, let us remember that the pursuit of peace is not a sign of weakness, but the ultimate expression of human reason.
Source:
thediplomat.com
