Despite being the longest State of the Union address in modern U.S. history, President Donald Trump’s 2026 speech marked the first time in two decades that an American president did not directly mention China in the annual address to Congress. Many observers have attributed the omission to timing: Trump is scheduled to meet Chinese President Xi Jinping in Beijing in April. But a closer look suggests that Trump’s careful approach to China reflects two important domestic factors: an internal Republican battle over tariffs – intensified by a recent Supreme Court ruling against his tariff authority – and the looming midterm elections later this year.

Trump’s upcoming trip to Beijing will be the first by a sitting American president since his own visit in 2017. He has repeatedly touted his “excellent relationship” with Xi. Earlier this month, Trump described a phone call between the two leaders as “very positive” and their relationship as “extremely good.” 

While Washington has adopted a more conciliatory tone toward Beijing – prioritizing trade over flashpoints such as Taiwan – Beijing has not fully reciprocated. Following the call, Chinese officials issued a statement warning against U.S. arms sales to Taiwan.

Some argue that even a president as unpredictable as Trump understands that publicly attacking China right now would be ill-timed if he hopes to secure trade deals during his April visit. However, Trump sharply criticized China in his 2018, 2019, and 2020 State of the Union addresses – even when meetings or calls with Xi were imminent. Why, then, the silence this time?

The answer lies in domestic politics. Throughout his second term, Trump has embraced an expansive view of presidential power, treating tariffs as a flexible instrument of leverage in negotiations with Beijing. But the Supreme Court’s recent rebuke of his use of global tariffs under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) has destabilized that strategy. The ruling has disrupted Trump’s economic agenda and restricted his ability to deploy tariffs quickly and unilaterally, effectively weakening one of Washington’s most potent tools of economic leverage over Beijing.

China – previously facing one of the highest tariff rates – saw its effective rate fall by 7 percentage points before Trump moved to restore measures under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974. Even so, Beijing now understands that Trump’s remaining economic tools are slower and more constrained, a reality that will shape negotiations when he arrives in Beijing in April.

Meanwhile, China has steadily strengthened its own leverage since the first trade war began in 2018. Beyond matching U.S. tariffs with retaliatory duties, Beijing has expanded its use of non-tariff countermeasures – tightening export controls on rare earth materials, adding U.S. defense and technology firms to regulatory blacklists, launching antidumping investigations, and suspending imports from selected American agricultural exporters. In 2025, China even posted a record $1.2 trillion trade surplus after redirecting exports to alternative markets despite U.S. tariffs. 

Against this backdrop, the Supreme Court’s ruling further weakens Trump’s negotiating position.

Complicating matters further, an internal Republican divide over Trump’s global trade war has been brewing for months. Senator Rand Paul (R-KY), a leading voice of the New Right within the GOP who advocates a more moderate approach to China, has been at the forefront of opposition to Trump’s tariffs since last year. Shortly before the Court’s ruling, Representative Don Bacon (R-NE) broke with Trump and other Republican leaders, supporting efforts to overturn tariffs on Canadian imports. Representative Thomas Massie (R-KY) backed the Court’s decision and even joined Democrats in protest during the State of the Union address. 

These “defected” GOP lawmakers reflected broader public frustration with the economy. Although inflation has slowed since the summer of 2022, prices remain high. Tariffs further exacerbated these pressures and have worried a growing number of Republicans who would prefer a stronger focus on affordability for their constituents. 

Beyond the legislators already mentioned, other prominent Republicans have also embraced the Supreme Court’s decision striking down Trump’s tariffs, including former Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-KY) and Senators Ted Cruz (R-TX), Susan Collins (R-ME), and Lisa Murkowski (R-AK). Even some Republicans who continue to support Trump have begun voicing concerns about the long-term effects of sustained tariffs. 

Threatening additional economic confrontation with China would reinforce the imperial presidency Trump has been projecting, which could further divide the Republican Party rather than unite it, especially as the public grows increasingly frustrated with his handling of the economy ahead of the midterm elections.

With a razor-thin majority in the House, Republicans must tread carefully in the months leading up to November. As the party’s de facto leader, Trump is well aware that midterm elections are typically decided on economic performance. China is unlikely to become a defining campaign issue unless a major crisis erupts in the Taiwan Strait or the South China Sea – both of which remain highly unlikely this year. In this environment, aggressively playing the “China card” would offer very limited political payoff.

In fact, excessive stigmatization of China could even backfire. Polls suggest that a majority of Americans are growing weary of Trump’s inflammatory rhetoric about China, particularly when it risks affecting people of Chinese descent. Chinese Americans – one of the fastest-growing groups of eligible voters – are poised to wield greater influence in this election cycle. Trump is likely aware that alienating this constituency could undermine recent Republican gains among Asian American voters.

Following the Supreme Court setback, Trump is in urgent need of a tangible economic victory he can present to Republican voters, especially those dissatisfied with current conditions. That urgency was evident in his State of the Union address, where he repeatedly declared that the United States is “winning so much.” His decision to omit direct criticism of China was a strategic calculation: preserving room for a potential trade deal that could calm internal party divisions and bolster Republican momentum heading into the midterms.