As the Human Rights Council prepares to convene on February 9, growing evidence links external support—to atrocities in the Darfur region, while the gum arabic trade emerges as a critical revenue source for armed actors.
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As the Human Rights Council prepares to convene on February 9, growing evidence links external support—to atrocities in the Darfur region, while the gum arabic trade emerges as a critical revenue source for armed actors.
On February 9, 2026, the United Nations Human Rights Council will hold an interactive dialogue on the situation in and around El-Fasher, Sudan, marking another critical moment in international efforts to address one of the world’s most severe humanitarian crises. The special session, mandated by Human Rights Council Resolution S-38/1 adopted on November 14, 2025, will examine the devastating consequences of the October 26 fall of El-Fasher to the Rapid Support Forces (RSF).
The resolution came in response to what UN officials describe as credible evidence of mass executions, ethnic-based killings, and systematic sexual violence committed by RSF forces and affiliated militias following their capture of the North Darfur capital after an 18-month siege. According to the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, between 70,000 and 100,000 civilians may remain trapped in the city, facing what survivors describe as “a crime scene” littered with burned bodies and abandoned markets.
Resolution S-38/1 demands immediate cessation of hostilities and condemns “the escalation of violence and atrocities allegedly committed by the Rapid Support Forces and associated and allied forces in and around El-Fasher,” including mass atrocities such as ethnically-motivated killings, torture, summary executions, forced recruitment, and arbitrary detention of civilians. The text specifically highlights the use of rape and other forms of sexual and gender-based violence as weapons of war.
The World Food Programme’s Director of Emergency Response, Ross Smith, told reporters in December that satellite imagery and survivor testimonies paint a horrifying picture. Those who managed to flee El-Fasher risked their lives on roads “littered with mines” and unexploded ordnance. More than 106,000 people have escaped the city since its fall, many finding refuge in Tawila, now an enormous displacement camp hosting over 650,000 people.
El-Fasher: A Pattern of Atrocities
Amnesty International documented testimonies from 28 survivors who managed to reach safety in Tawila and Tina, a town near the border with Chad. The accounts describe groups of unarmed men being coldly executed by RSF fighters, civilians held hostage for ransom, and widespread sexual violence against women and girls. Three interviews were conducted in person in Chad, with others conducted remotely by telephone due to security constraints.
The most shocking incident occurred at the Saudi Maternity Hospital in El-Fasher, where the World Health Organization reported that more than 460 patients and medical staff were killed during the RSF assault. The systematic targeting of healthcare facilities and humanitarian workers represents a clear violation of international humanitarian law.
On November 3, the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court issued a statement expressing deep alarm about the situation in El-Fasher, noting that the documented violations could constitute war crimes and crimes against humanity. A week later, UN officials warned of “possible mass atrocities.”
The humanitarian consequences extend beyond immediate violence. On November 3, the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification’s Famine Review Committee confirmed famine conditions in El-Fasher and Kadugli, estimating that more than 21.2 million people face acute food insecurity, with 375,000—the majority in Darfur—on the brink of starvation. The UN resolution condemns the use of starvation as a method of warfare.
The UAE’s Troubling Role
Throughout the conflict, which began in April 2023 between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) led by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and the RSF commanded by General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as “Hemetti,” international attention has increasingly focused on external actors fueling the violence. Among these, the United Arab Emirates stands out for its systematic support to the RSF.
At an October 30 UN Security Council meeting, tensions erupted when the UAE representative announced financial assistance for El-Fasher following the massacres. Sudan’s permanent representative, Al Harith Idriss, responded sharply: “Mr. President, there is no civil war in Sudan, but an aggression led by the United Arab Emirates through its local proxy: the Rapid Support Forces. Hearing this representative speak about Sudan as if it were under Abu Dhabi’s guardianship constitutes an insult to this Council and contempt for the Sudanese people and their suffering.”
He continued: “How is it possible that such a state speaks of peace in this chamber while sending weapons to those who kill, promising them power in Sudan, while seeking to separate a region of the country to plunder Sudan’s wealth and gold?”
Multiple investigations have documented the UAE’s support for the RSF. According to expert analysis from Cameron Hudson, a former CIA official now at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, “The scale of UAE support to the RSF has doubled since the recapture of Khartoum [in April 2025] by the regular army. The UAE is prepared to do anything to help the RSF win on the ground, even if it enables the atrocities we are witnessing today in El-Fasher.”
Amnesty International has identified French and Chinese weapons supplied through the UAE to RSF forces on the battlefield. French military equipment manufactured by KNDS France and Lacroix, British weapons, Canadian arms, and Bulgarian materiel have all been documented in RSF hands—transfers that violate the European embargo prohibiting “the sale, supply, transfer or export of arms and related materiel—including weapons and ammunition—to Sudan by nationals of Member States or from the territory of Member States.”
According to Le Monde’s investigation, through a complex logistics chain involving neighboring countries such as Chad, Libya, South Sudan, Uganda, and the port of Bosaso in Somalia, Abu Dhabi has orchestrated an airlift delivering advanced weaponry to its Sudanese partner. This includes advanced Chinese-made drones, small arms, heavy machine guns, vehicles, artillery, mortars, ammunition, sophisticated air defense systems, and even a contingent of hundreds of Colombian mercenaries deployed to the El-Fasher battlefield.
An analyst familiar with Sudan, speaking on condition of anonymity due to involvement in conflict resolution efforts, confirmed: “I would say that the RSF and affiliated militias now control 80% of the producing trees. Gum arabic significantly contributes to the RSF’s war economy, alongside gold extracted from mines in the regions they control. Livestock comes next. But gum arabic is increasingly overtaking the rest because it’s a reliable production that can easily be sold through smuggling.”
The Gum Arabic Connection
Beyond the immediate horror of violence, a less visible but equally troubling dimension of Sudan’s conflict involves the trade in gum arabic—a natural resin harvested from acacia trees that is indispensable to numerous global industries. The substance acts as a natural binder, stabilizer, and thickener in foods, beverages, pharmaceuticals, cosmetics, and paints. Known on ingredient labels as E414, gum arabic has no natural or synthetic substitute that matches its functionality.
Sudan historically produced 70-80% of global gum arabic supply, providing supplementary income to approximately five million people across one million rural households. Before the war, the sector accounted for roughly 15% of Sudan’s total exports, valued between $111 million and $183 million annually according to various estimates.
The “gum arabic belt” stretches from the Darfour region in the west to Blue Nile province on the Ethiopian border in the east. This is precisely where the hashab variety—the highest quality gum arabic—is produced. The RSF’s seizure of Darfur and much of Kordofan means the paramilitary force now controls the majority of Sudan’s gum arabic production zones.
A November 2025 report by PAX, a Dutch peace organization, documented how gum arabic has become deeply entangled with violence and predation by armed actors since the conflict began. At the war’s outset, RSF forces and allied militias looted warehouses and burned fields. A representative from Afritec, a Sudanese subsidiary of French processor Nexira, told Bloomberg that the RSF “has burned fields, killed farmers, and looted thousands of metric tons from warehouses in Khartoum—including 3,000 tons from Afritec.”
According to the UN Panel of Experts’ April 2025 report, local traders from East Darfur and Nyala confirmed that approximately 3,700 tons valued at roughly $14.6 million were stolen between January and June 2024 alone. Additional incidents were reported in Zalingei (West Darfur), Al Mujald (West Kordofan), and El-Geneina (West Darfur). Trade associations and UN sources suggest that tens of thousands of tons may have been looted since the conflict began.
The UN Panel found that looting was condoned by RSF commanders as compensation for themselves and their soldiers to ensure loyalty. By October 2024, fees were being imposed in RSF-controlled areas in Darfur and Kordofan.
Professor Tarig Mahmoud of Kordofan University explained to PAX researchers that unofficial charges along trade routes have risen sharply since the outbreak of war. “The taxes go to armed thugs in the streets, and if you don’t pay, you can lose your goods—or even your life.”
A senior manager from a Khartoum-based trading company told Bloomberg: “You have to pay a lot of money to the Janjaweed… They stop the trucks and you have to pay for the trucks to move. They either steal some of it or they make you pay.” He reported routinely paying around $2,500 per truck.
Smuggling Routes and European Markets
The conflict has transformed Sudan’s gum arabic trade from a regulated export sector into a militarized shadow economy. By late 2024, RSF-affiliated gum was being traded through fully institutionalized informal border markets, with trucks carrying the product to neighboring countries and onward to ports for shipment.
According to the UN Panel of Experts, cargo volumes reaching RSF-controlled Chadian borders reportedly fluctuated annually between 50,000 and 70,000 tons, while an estimated 30,000-40,000 tons crossed into Libya and Egypt between April and October 2024. Border crossing fees on these routes ranged from $2,200 to $3,300 per ton. Kenya’s Port of Mombasa has also emerged as a crucial transit point in the illicit export of gum arabic.
The looting in May 2025 of Al-Nahud, West Kordofan—a strategic gum arabic hub linking RSF-held western areas and army-held eastern regions—illustrates the scale of disruption. Traders told reporters that around one-third of the gum arabic cultivated that season had been looted by the RSF, with the stolen volume valued at up to $125 million.
Despite these disruptions, European supply chains have remained intact through a combination of continued Sudanese sourcing and rising re-exports from neighboring states. Eurostat data show that while imports from Sudan to the EU and UK dropped from 66,700 tons in 2022 to 49,900 tons in 2024—a 25% decline—their value increased from €92.8 million to €105.2 million, reflecting price surges.
Neighboring countries partly compensated for reduced Sudanese volumes, though much of this gum likely originated in Sudan and crossed RSF-controlled border routes. Imports from Chad rose from 9,700 tons in 2023 to 13,500 tons in 2024, while Egypt (approximately 2,500 tons), Eritrea (approximately 900 tons), and South Sudan (approximately 800 tons) emerged as new exporters. Europe imported about 19,700 tons from neighboring countries in 2024, compared to 12,200 tons in 2023—a 62% increase.
Two French family-owned companies dominate global gum arabic processing. Nexira, founded in 1895 and owned by the Dondain family, represents more than 40% of the world’s processed gum arabic market alone. Alland & Robert, which celebrated its 150th anniversary in 2024, ranks second, well ahead of German competitors based in Hamburg.
According to Bloomberg’s analysis of Sayari data, which tracks international trade and corporate transactions, Nexira imported 3,679 tons from Sudan between May 2023 and January 2025, including 599 tons from Afritec. Alland & Robert purchased 484 tons from Sudanese companies and 1,161 tons from Chad in 2024.
Both companies emphasize their commitment to responsible sourcing and traceability. Nexira stated to journalists that it suspended imports for four months in 2023 and three weeks in 2025, and that “virtually all acacia gum purchased by Nexira in Sudan is shipped from Port Sudan, where our suppliers have relocated their activities since the start of the conflict.”
Alland & Robert responded that it continues its trade with all required precautions, noting that “acacia gum constitutes one of the rare sustainable economic levers for millions of Sudanese harvesters, and one of their last sources of income during the conflict period. Abandoning the sector would deprive these communities of essential revenue and further weaken an already severely tested social fabric.”
However, the PAX report highlights significant gaps in verification. Sudanese researcher Mohamed Salah noted: “It is very difficult to estimate the volume and value of these exports” through RSF-controlled areas. He concluded bluntly: “The majority of profits go to the militias. Trade in gum arabic from Sudan fuels the war.”
A Sudanese trader now based in Chad told PAX researchers: “I was in South Sudan and Chad for several years, and the total production here is low, less than 10%. They are not producers… Any gum arabic used by these companies originates from Sudan and came to the companies in different ways.”
The Due Diligence Challenge
French customs data reveal a troubling pattern. While import volume fell from 34,351 tons in 2023 to 30,436 tons in 2025, import value increased from €52.2 million to €63.6 million—a clear indication that higher prices driven by conflict disruption are flowing back through the supply chain.
France’s 2017 Duty of Vigilance Law (Loi de Vigilance) requires large French companies to establish and implement vigilance plans covering identification, prevention, and mitigation of serious human rights and environmental risks throughout their supply chains. Major French multinationals using gum arabic, such as L’Oréal and Danone, fall under this legislation.
At L’Oréal’s annual general meeting on May 29, 2025, French activist shareholder group IPAC (Initiative Pour un Actionnariat Citoyen) raised questions about the company’s exposure to human rights risks linked to Sudanese gum arabic. L’Oréal responded that its use of Sudanese gum was “minime” (minimal) and that ethical concerns had prompted dialogue with suppliers to transition responsibly toward more stable sourcing regions.
However, the PAX report notes that L’Oréal’s most recent Vigilance Plan does not mention Sudan, gum arabic, or its suppliers Nexira and Alland & Robert, suggesting gaps in implementation. French NGO Sherpa highlighted similar concerns in an October 2024 assessment of French companies’ vigilance reporting.
The European Union’s Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive (CSDDD), adopted in 2024, was designed to harmonize and strengthen due diligence requirements for large companies operating in the EU. However, following the European Parliament’s November 2025 vote on omnibus simplification proposals, some thresholds and downstream obligations have been narrowed, potentially delaying or limiting the directive’s practical impact on sectors such as gum arabic trade.
Regional Threats and International Responsibilities
Following the fall of El-Fasher, RSF forces have moved eastward, threatening civilian populations in North and South Kordofan regions. The paramilitaries captured the town of Bara, 30 kilometers from El-Obeid, the North Kordofan capital, just before taking El-Fasher, though Sudanese armed forces recaptured Bara on November 17.
El-Obeid itself faces potential siege. On November 3, a drone strike reportedly killed at least 40 people attending a funeral. In addition to encircling El-Obeid, RSF forces continue to besiege Kadugli in South Kordofan. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees reports that more than 40,000 people have been displaced from North Kordofan since November 18.
UN Secretary-General António Guterres expressed deep alarm on December 8 over reports of at least 30 civilian deaths and numerous injuries in a drone strike against the town of Katila in South Darfur State. The attack occurred approximately 150 kilometers southwest of Nyala. Additional civilian casualties were reported in another strike the same day against Kutum in North Darfur State.
“The Secretary-General condemns all attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure. He demands that all parties respect their obligations under international law, including international humanitarian law and international human rights law, in all areas of active conflict in Sudan,” his deputy spokesperson Farhan Haq stated.
Resolution S-38/1 condemns all forms of external interference fueling the conflict and reminds all parties and external actors—states and others—facilitating the transfer of weapons and military equipment to Darfour of their obligation to respect and implement the Darfour arms embargo imposed by Security Council Resolution 1556 (2004) and subsequent resolutions.
The resolution requests the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for Sudan to urgently investigate violations of international humanitarian law and international human rights law committed in and around El-Fasher, and to identify individuals reasonably believed responsible for these violations. The mission is scheduled to present its findings to the Human Rights Council’s 61st session (February 23-March 31, 2026), with a strengthened interactive dialogue involving the High Commissioner and the Human Rights Expert on Sudan.
The Path Forward
As the February 9 interactive dialogue approaches, international pressure is mounting for concrete action beyond condemnations. The Human Rights Council resolution emphasizes that there is no military solution to Sudan’s crisis and reiterates calls for an immediate and comprehensive ceasefire between all parties, without preconditions.
The text demands establishment of an independent mechanism to monitor ceasefire compliance, rehabilitation of critical infrastructure, a negotiated and peaceful settlement based on inclusive Sudanese-led dialogue actively involving civil society actors including women and youth, and launch of a credible and inclusive political transition process leading to a democratically elected government following a civilian-led transition period.
Tom Fletcher, the UN’s humanitarian affairs chief, told the Security Council on October 31: “We don’t hear the screams, but—as we gather here—the horror continues.”
For the millions of Sudanese facing what the UN describes as the world’s largest humanitarian crisis, the question is whether international attention will translate into meaningful action to halt the flow of weapons and resources sustaining the conflict, or whether the pattern of condemnations without consequences will continue while atrocities mount.
The gum arabic case illustrates how global commerce can become entangled with violence when oversight mechanisms fail. As the PAX report concludes: “The international community, including corporate actors, must act to ensure that ongoing trade does not continue to fund RSF war efforts or genocidal violence.”
The February 9 session represents an opportunity for the international community to demonstrate that accountability for mass atrocities is more than rhetoric. Survivors fleeing El-Fasher, trapped civilians in besieged cities across Kordofan, and the millions displaced by Sudan’s war are watching to see if words will finally be matched by action.
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First published in this link of The European Times.