On January 21, Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto delivered an address at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland. The president’s secretariat had earlier that day promised he would lay out the tenets of “Prabowonomics.”

In the end, the speech was essentially a pitch to investors about why their money is safe in Indonesia. But the president also took the opportunity to tout the successes of his flagship domestic economic policies. In the 15 months since taking office, his government had fed 59.8 million people, built 166 new boarding schools, and would soon open 83,000 drugstores, the president claimed.

These are, of course, references to three major policies of this Prabowo government: makan bergizi gratis (free meals for school children and pregnant mothers), sekolah rakyat (free boarding schools for children in poverty), and kooperasi desa merah-putih (government-run village cooperatives selling food, fertilizer, gas and medicine).

Taken together, these constitute the central pillars of Prabowo’s economic program in much the same way as infrastructure projects did for his predecessor, Joko Widodo. But they also reveal the president’s distinctive approach to economic development, something perhaps resembling a “Prabowonomics.”

In the first place, all three programs are ostensibly in service of the president’s goal of eliminating extreme poverty in Indonesia, itself part of a broader vision to make Indonesia a high-income country by 2045. Prabowo has even repeatedly linked this goal to his personal ambitions. During his speech in Davos, he went as far as to say this was the sole mission of the remaining years of his life.

For this reason, the programs consciously target the poorest parts of Indonesian society: the “labourers, hawkers and street cleaners” of the country, Prabowo explained in Davos. Makan bergizi gratis is for those who cannot afford enough food, sekolah rakyat for those who lack access to education, and kooperasi to bring down the basic costs in rural low-income villages.

Secondly, all three policies are designed as social assistance-style provisions. They are easy to understand and free at the point of use. This is in contrast to incentive-based or growth-centered development policies favored by orthodox economic policy-makers, such as targeted tax relief schemes.

This comes at great cost, of course. A colossal $10 billion was spent last year on makan bergizi gratis, and the body responsible for the program will spend $71.5 million per day on the project this year. The government has budgeted $5 billion for kooperasi merah-putih, some of which will be loaned from state-owned banks such as Himbara, and some from the government’s so-called surplus budget balance. The cost of just these two policies ($30 billion) is equivalent to 15 percent of Indonesia’s total government spending in 2024 ($200 billion).

But Prabowo trusts the financial outlays will be worth it, not least for his own political fortunes. “Prabowo has basically learnt of the vote-buying power of social assistance from his predecessors”, said Andree Surianta, a researcher at the Centre for Indonesian Policy Studies. Both former presidents Widodo and Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono used similar programs to drum up support before elections. “Prabowo is taking it to a new level, increasing the coverage to near universal and throughout his term”, he added.

Finally, Prabowo’s approach is characterized by a highly centralized decision-making model, and the involvement of the military and police in implementation. This is a result of how the general-turned-president views socio-economic problems in Indonesia: as missions to undertake by directing the state from atop as if it were a military platoon. It also fits with the president’s reintroduction of the military into civilian affairs more broadly, most clearly seen when, in March, the government passed a controversial law allowing armed forces personnel to hold more civilian posts.

The body running makan bergizi gratis is dominated by retired military and police officers loyal to Prabowo, and the agency’s own internal memo has made clear that it would rely upon pre-existing military logistics networks. As of the end of last year, the police had set up 1,147 kitchens to serve the programme.

Last month, Prabowo urged the military and police to deploy personnel to help support the rollout of sekolah rakyat too, and government ministers have extolled the virtues of military discipline in civilian education. The army will help build the kooperasi depots on the direct orders of the president, according to the minister in charge.

Once again, Prabowo may believe military involvement will not only be accepted by much of the Indonesian public but also welcomed. The military remains Indonesia’s most trusted state institution, and over three-quarters of Indonesians say military or authoritarian rule would be a good way of governing their country, according to a recent Pew Research Center study.

It is not uncommon to hear that the current Indonesian administration lacks strategic direction. That might be true. But what it certainly doesn’t lack is a distinctive style, which has first and foremost been applied to its national economic policy. Makan bergizi gratis, sekolah rakyat, and kooperasi merah putih are all results of this style, which may well come to be theorized as “Prabowonomics”. But as trillions of rupiah are spent on these programs, the Indonesian people will soon make up their mind about these policies in practice.